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THE CONCEPT OF ENGAGEMENT
SUMMARY
In this paper, we illuminate the basic features of the concept of engagement, 
which has only become possible in the secular world, with the emergence 
of the modern individual deprived of any stable, eternal order or hierarchy 
of values. Still, engagement is not only individual but also collective, as 
the lack of certainty about the truth affects not only the community and 
society but also motivates them to follow the same paradigm as the 
individual – themselves at stake, without knowing where it could possibly 
lead, but with the intention to produce some tangible and stable socio-
cosmic structures that could alleviate man’s uncertainty and thus insecurity. 
The necessity of engagement stems from the circumstance that man 
lives in a context saturated with meanings that call him out in advance 
and influence him. Therefore, engagement means actually acting back 
to the being-exposed to meanings and structures that have already 
affected man and his situation. One section of the text deals with an 
understanding of engagement in the contemporary, “postmodern” era.
Introduction
The real basis for the coinage of the term, which first emerged in social dis-
course and then, in theory, is the daily use of the corresponding word in French 
and afterwards in other languages. The word begins to crystallize as a concept 
parallel to the emergence of theoretical thoughts on engagement, which did not 
exist before the XIX, although it peaked in the XX century. Engagement, as an 
epochally typical paradigm of existence (private and public, as well as individu-
al and collective) comes to the focus of attention only in late secularity, when 
man, as being deprived of “eternally” valid cosmic order by the course of history 
itself, was confronted with the task to rearrange social reality, independently, 
solely relying upon himself, and to find (out) a new, widely acceptable hierar-
chy of values, which should determine an individual and collective way of life.
Until that moment, one could in his orientation rely upon generally well-
known, but not necessarily reflected cosmo-social markers. Of course, in ear-
lier times too, one could not know all that was important for him to be ac-
quainted with. Yet, when we put aside the for centuries unchallenged rule of 
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the leading epistemic paradigm, in antiquity it was believed that theory is 
basically capable to deal with life practice. Thus, theory and practice form a 
functional circle: practice “raises” real questions, to which theory gives her an-
swers – with a reliance on the emerging practice of (life) theory. In a relatively 
well-ordered and norm-dependent world picture, there was room for a para-
digm of the practical mind – as an expression of confidence in the possibility 
that human practice can be regulated by ratio.
By overcoming the previously self-contained world picture, the indepen-
dent search for truth and the normative becomes not only a possibility but 
also, in a way, a necessity – both for individual and for the collectivities. Karl 
Marx was among the first to feel and announce that the modern era not only 
provides an opportunity for active action to achieve certain social goals but 
that history has entered a stage in which the future largely depends on active 
social engagement. The background of Marx’s famous 11th thesis on Feuerbach 
is that the truth – about man, social reality, history – is known as a product of 
(Marxian) thought of liberation and that then it is all about shifting it into re-
ality. This announced not only that humanity entered into the era of ideologies 
but also, at the same time, the future time’s necessity of engagement.
However, the concept of engagement could not be simply reduced to en-
gagement for an ideology. It turned out that the confidence of Marx and the 
others in the ability to ascertain, if not the ultimate, then at least the epoch-rel-
ative truths – was premature. Opening up the space for the paradigm of (so-
cial) engagement did not in itself mean that in a post-theocentric world pic-
ture one could easily reach reliable truth-certainties. Moreover, the then-man 
experienced a shortage of reliable truths and safe instructions for daily action:
Therefore, to engage in some direction, for some subject, means to commence 
acting, not necessarily knowing where one is going to, not even knowing wheth-
er that which is to be done good or not, whether its goals will be achieved or 
not. That is why we can often engage, as the saying goes, as if “head through 
the wall”. (Makowiak 2005)
Thus, “[u]rgency of engagement” – both individual and collective – “the 
absence of a calculation of consequences, goes hand in hand with its unpre-
dictability, with the accepted unpredictability ...” (ibid.) In one of the most 
brilliant philosophical dialogues of the XX century, the author, using drama-
turgical mimicry puts the following words to one of his heroes’ mouth: “The 
French are supposed to be the most logical thinker in the world, but I think 
only you Russians, Ivan, are crazy enough to act on the basis of a cogent chain 
of reasoning, no matter where it leads.” (Suits 1978: 69; our emphasize). Here, 
however, this is not about any specific “national character”, but rather of the 
modern human’s situation, regardless of personal and/ or national, civilization-
al mentality. The man simply found himself in the middle of epochal structure 
which stands for the tendency of suspension of phronesis.
Therefore, in a preliminary approximation, it should be concluded, that en-
gagement is an expression of the necessity to act because of the lack of certainty 
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or the preconditions for acquiring it. One must engage due to an acute absence 
of certainty; one acts not out of knowledge on reality and on the practically 
necessary, but precisely thanks to their absence. Still, such a way of acting can 
hardly eliminate the initial state of uncertainty. To be engaged means inev-
itability of acting out of uncertainty – into uncertainty. Under such circum-
stances, an engaging action could even be equated with a brave daring, which 
means a shift towards life-practical decisionism, because the engaged person is 
obviously not a sovereignly acting “subject”. However, due to the fundamen-
tal lack of theoretical certainty prior to taking action, it is usually expected to 
achieve a certain harmony of speaking/writing and acting, since the integration 
of publicly stated intention of an act and its effect is nevertheless considered 
to be a compensatory modality for truth-attaining through practice, instead of 
through theory. But even so, the “truth” could be reached neither in this way.
Therefore, engagement, epistemologically speaking, must be “emerging 
knowledge that is only gained through action”, ie. one form of faire(-a)-savoir 
(Makowiak 2005) The need to make a decision in a factual life situation and 
when things are not clear in advance is the reverse side of a lack of knowledge so 
that the coercion necessity of decisionism stems from uncertainty and finally from 
insecurity. Then knowledge, or what is, under the circumstances, possibly the 
closest to it, is sought to be obtained by “provoking” the environment through 
action so that the manifestation of the consequences of a particular provoking 
act is to lead to factual truth, which should be a prerequisite for (further) action.
In this sense, Sartre’s theorem is crucial for discerning the relationship 
between theory and practice peculiar to our time: “the real world is revealed 
only by action” (Sartre 1988: 65). According to him, “[t]he prose-writer is a 
man who has chosen a certain method of secondary action that we may call 
action by disclosure. [...] He knows what to reveal is to change and that one 
can only reveal by planning to change” (ibid: 37; our emphasis). The very last 
statement is a dubitable one. For him, it is impossible to take a not-interest-
ed attitude towards the truth, which excludes personal involvement, i.e. be-
ing-already-involved. The notion of “secondary action” is also noteworthy. It 
has an experimental character – to intentionally make reality to manifest itself, 
which needs to increase the degree of certainty necessary for acting actually. 
The secondary action precedes the primary one, the one by which an acting 
person actually wants to accomplish something. Secondary action, which is a 
form of engagement particularly important in illuminating its nature, means 
to act for the sake of practical certainty, which is a prerequisite for an action 
aiming to something. This kind of action is, therefore, a preliminary action, 
which should provide a basis for further “actual agency”.1
1  Besides, engagement, as a modus operandi of integrated search – both for the true 
and practically expedient – is the inversion of the model underlying the pragmatic the-
ory of meaning. If for the latter the meaning of some views is embodied by the practical 
patterns adhered to by the people who follow them, then by the “engaged notion of 
truth” the meaning is rendered based on action.  
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 In the absence of a way to reach the truth, so to say “straightforwardly”, 
and feeling at the same time need for it, even more strongly than ever before – 
because man does not live in a “raw” reality, but in the field of the established, 
recognized, considered as such and such, i.e. in a medium of language, there-
fore in the realm where it is all about truth2 – he decides to take a radical step: 
to put himself at stake, in order to possibly come to some sort of provisional, 
situational certainty, or at least to diminish a present level of uncertainty. En-
gagement is therefore a sort of personal decisionism forced by epochal circum-
stances. “To engage means to pledge one’s own person” (Makowiak 2005); and 
precisely this pledging, has in common two basic semantic-conceptual branches 
of this term: action, or (self)commitment by, mostly, although not exclusively, 
own or other’s word, act, emotion, contract...
As the study of the historical etymology of the French word engagement in-
dicates, it derives from gage (guarantee / pledge), which is “a material variant of 
[being-]hostage”3. If in the Middle Ages a material pledge was a substitute for 
self-pledging – for the sake of some debt or some another sort of guarantees, 
then in the modern condition, in an altered form, an immaterial form of (self)
pledging is restituted – but no longer by pledging own body, but as practical 
pledging (of content, values, meaning ...) of one’s own person. He is a hostage 
again, but not of someone else’s, but a “hostage” of absent truth, which he must 
always try to, so to say, “redeem” – by provoking acts of engagement.
Thus, a modern man appears here in a threefold role: a. the one who pleads 
himself, b. who provokes to know, and c. who radically bears the consequenc-
es of own acting/provocation – by receiving back from the provoked reality 
a raw, factual – hitherto only embedded, but from now on “dis-embedded” 
truth. Provocatio realitatis becomes the leading practically-hermeneutic mo-
dality of the existence of the human. The modern era made him explicitly fi-
nite and therefore forced to engage oneself, as a direct answer to the situation.
In modern times, it took place a fundamental change in the understanding 
of place, nature, and even the sense of truth. When it comes to the surround-
ing reality, it is either impossible to establish the truth concerning it without 
provoking her by engagement – personal and/or collective – which obviously 
changes it, or that the reality is not even valuable enough, finally is not true, 
which raises the question of the purpose to search the truth on such a reality. 
Hence the wrong can be not only a statement about reality, a theory about it 
– but even reality itself can be “faulty”. Based on this, it is even imaginable to 
develop not only a hatred attitude towards social reality, or some its parts, but 
also to urge establishing a more correct, true reality, and correlatively – a true 
2  Husserl speaks of man’s “self-understanding as being in being called to a life of ap-
odicticity” (1970: 340; original emphasis). And the purpose of this demand is determined 
as follows: “But all this speculative knowledge is meant to serve man in his human pur-
poses so that he may order his worldly life in the happiest possible way and shield it 
from disease, from every sort of evil fate, from disaster and death.” (ibid: 284).
3  Bernard Cerquiglini, https://balises.bpi.fr/langues/savez-vous-a-quoi-lengagement-
engage (accessed: September 15th, 2019).
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man. Moreover, assuming a certain social determinism, in theory, it is possi-
ble to take point of departure from the fact that a true man can emerge only 
if surrounded by the true reality. Then the radical transformation of reality – 
i.e. revolution, becomes a social-historical first-class task.
And the psycho-emotional pretext for revolution: hatred of the real, i.e. 
towards to current social reality, tacitly equated with reality in general, it was 
completely unimaginable, and theoretically and practically impossible, until 
the modern age, when the European man gave himself the right and task to 
stands as a measure of all things and of all reality. If Plato introduced an on-
tological comparative by which ideas, for example, were more true than sen-
sually observable objects, then in the modern situation, the criterion of the 
attributively re-interpreted truth of the real becomes its correspondence to 
human projections, i.e. to his creative imagination, which came to be the ori-
gin of compensatory truthfulness. So truth as correspondence, in an epochal 
sense, began to become obsolete.
Instead, to provide statements that correspond to the current (flawed and 
untrue) reality, the most important thing became the activity that was to create 
the truth – the true world and the true man, either through a constant, regular 
engagement that should lead to continuous progress – both, anthropological 
and social, or through extraordinary engagement for radical change – revo-
lution. The latter solution becomes a historical option when one experienc-
es a failure in attempts to change the world evolutionarily in accordance with 
one’s own intentions. So the praxis of engagement could conceptually be de-
termined as the effort of truth-creation – within of a currently truth-less world.
The forerunner of this turn from the conception truth as primarily epis-
temic to the existential category was Kierkegaard. According to him, the in-
dividual should ask himself personally about the truth, striving to reach per-
sonal truth with his existence – since there is no general truth, as well as that 
it has no systemic or even predominantly theoretical character. Instead of a 
firmly bound “circle” composed of theory and practice, as, perhaps ideally, it 
was presented at the beginnings of European philosophy, there remains only 
an auxiliary function for the thinking in the self-activities of existence. The 
basis of action cannot be in thinking, but it is rather compelled to try to pro-
duce its ground in and by itself – ultimately in a radical decision. Because of 
this a decision making individual can only by means of his life – when faced 
with its consequences – empirically determine whether his previous decision 
produced the effect of foundation.
Under presuppositions of the engaged decisionalism, one can only after-
wards, by reflecting on one’s consequent life practice, determine whether what 
one has committed oneself to is eligible to become his foundation. All of this 
is to point out that Descartes proclaimed the search of European man for the 
fundamentum inconcussum, which is the historical demarcation line between 
the modern and the pre-modern, with an existential turn towards engagement 
was altered in a few ways. The foundation of knowledge is no longer sought, 
but the foundation of existence and knowledge has lost its founding function 
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for human life, while the thought is overwhelmingly absorbed by life practice 
– as an existential reflection. There took place, so to speak, an epochal fall into 
practicalism – through a “short circuit” between what was previously called 
“practice” and “theory”, so that the latter, at least in an existential context, be-
comes essentially epiphenomenal.
We sketched the connection between engagement and the modern epoch. 
Still, it would be an exaggeration to say that a pre-modern man could not en-
gage. As a matter of fact, the human world was never so well-organized that it 
could not and/ or should change in something. On the other hand, a man of high 
civilizations was never totally absorbed by his world(-picture), and therefore he 
was not completely devoid of the possibility to choose and act. Therefore, Ge-
hlen is right in saying that “human life has the paradoxical feature that it must 
be engaged [eingesetzt]” (Gehlen: 2016: 300; our emphasis). As being endowed 
with reason, o human makes decisions, choices, has preferences, etc., and he 
cannot put aside all that even in the most difficult situations, albeit fighting 
for bare survival, for instance. Therefore, in some sense it could be stated, that 
[pre-societal] “engagement” for survival is a kind of engagement avant lettre.
Historical Background and the Core of the Concept
The reality in which man lives is organized as a series of circumstances and 
states of affairs that for him carry the hermeneutic sign of as (Aristotelian he) 
– i. e. they are defined as certain so and so things, and in so far as they can be 
explicitly interpreted. This series is not a set of individual data, but it always 
produces a living environment (Diltheyean Lebenszusammenhang) whose indi-
vidual elements should not be viewed separately. It is even more important that 
circumstances are not only internally related, but that they are here for the cor-
responding entity (one I, or We), whose all-encompassing “objective” correlate 
is my/ our situation. “It [situation] contains no static moments, but ‘events’. 
[...] Events ‘happen to me’. [...] What happens has a relation to me; it radiates 
into my own I” (Heidegger 2000: 173, 174). But this does not mean that human 
has an interpretative, let alone factual, power to determine the “essence” of 
circumstances at his discretion; the interpretative reference of circumstances 
to man is rather a consequence of his ontological co-determination by them.
The truth about human and truth about (surrounding) reality are inseparable, 
so this situational determination of truth – both on the “subjective” and “ob-
jective” side –  finds its expression in another, secondary correlation: of what 
is, or what is interpreted. In these circumstances, interpretation is always qual-
ified as a, at least potential, act, which is exercised over the interpreted state 
of affairs. This is possible only because the factual, speechless “interpretation” 
has previously been exposed to the real influence of the circumstances. So the 
connective member of being and (interpretative) speech is action, effect. The 
human activity is not primarily relevant as a kind of Ersatz-reality, but rather 
its exposure to the “impact” of circumstances. Human’s indispensable com-
mitment to act means actually, in return, acting back to his prior exposure to 
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personal and impersonal influences, which already took place. Moreover, en-
gagement is a necessity that one must not avoid unless one wishes to be equiv-
alent to just a passive outcome of his circumstances. Finally, a person can pro-
voke reality, influence it, etc., only because it previously excitated him, and 
this always in a far more powerful and far-reaching way that surpasses his ca-
pabilities to cognize the given and to act (back). That is the essence of human’s 
condition of finiteness.
However, the fact that an interpretation or the speech is an act-related does 
not mean that we are dealing with conceptually determined performative acts 
– such as, for example, institutional acts when a statement or gesture creates 
a new state of affairs. Unlike such acts, which with certainty produce a change 
in an area of  purely symbolic reality, when it comes to engaged acts, one can 
mostly speak on uncertainty about their outcomes, i.e. whether the intended ef-
fect will be accomplished within (existential and/or social) reality. On the other 
hand, the intentional performativity is not even necessary in engagement, since 
it is possible for a human not only to be engaged when he does not know and/
or do not want to, but he can also engage even when he is not aware of, since 
his acts “as such” serve as a tacit, although involuntarily invitation to others to 
follow them, i.e. to act in the same manner in similar situations. Understand-
ing the inevitability of a condition of commitment, where engagement does not 
exclusively coincide with action, is represented by Sartre, admittedly, without 
reflecting on epochal typicality of the problem by himself:
If I […] choose to […] I am not committing myself alone […] my action commits 
all mankind. Or […] if I decide to marry and have children […] I am nonetheless 
[potentially – Ch. K.] committing not only myself but all of humanity, to the 
practice of monogamy. I am therefore responsible for myself and everyone else, 
and I am fashioning a certain image of man as I choose him to be. In choosing 
myself, I choose man [‘as such’ – Ch. K.]. (Sartre 2007: 24–25)
It is not only man’s “being” inseparable from his situation, but his situation 
“belongs” in a way potentially to the others, and same goes for each and ev-
ery person. My situation could possibly be ascribed to other people; it is not 
characterized with Heideggerian Jemeinigkeit (“mineness”).
A few years after Sartre, Gehlen, it seems more thoroughly, touched on the 
core of the condition, in which the human has already lived for a certain time:
When major political and real changes in a highly differentiated society have 
no longer a common focus, they brake, tease and collide with one another – 
insecurity becomes universal. Then one has to make experiments with what lies 
at the very core [...] A many of publicly expressed opinions emerge, and they 
make the underground current into which can fall almost everything – since in 
this constellation, any statement appears as a possible action. (Gehlen 2016: 48; 
our emphasizes)
Uncertainty, it turned out, provokes insecurity. For modernity typical insecu-
rity of human’s situation compels him to experiment, not only with something 
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interesting that arouses his curiosity – as in modern exact sciences – but also 
with the “essential”, which is until then being considered immutable, and, ulti-
mately, even with oneself. That experimentation is not a matter of mere play, or, 
inversely: the modern man must play an utterly serious “game” – with himself 
and his world. The point of this experimental engagement is to re-satisfy the 
“basic need for being grounded and established” (ibid), the absence of which is 
one of the key problems of modernity. In so doing, engagement, as the existen-
tial modus operandi of human existence in a secular world, carries a teleological 
moment – as engagement for self-fulfillment: “By engagement, we understand 
the concrete acceptance of responsibility for the work of future [self-]fulfill-
ment, for man’s directing attempts to shape [own] future” (Landsberg 1998: 119).
In such a constellation, man is not only compelled to experiment with the 
until then “essential”, but he does so even when he is not aware of it, since “any 
statement appears as a possible action” and a(n) (public) action could “commit 
all of humanity”. Not only can the reflection lay far behind what is actually, 
but the reflection could even turn out to be something more than what origi-
nally is – since, for Gehlen, she “can be understood as a trial acting” (Gehlen 
2016: 12–13). In short, a very strange mixture of statements, thinking, acting 
and their receptions ensued, and uncertainty concerning their meaning pro-
duces human’s existential sense of insecurity. Then becomes sometimes un-
clear whether an action will emerge from the mixture, or whether it will re-
main merely a speech or even just a reflexive act, as is it unclear whether that 
action will sink back into the ephemerality of everyday life the very moment 
after it was performed, or whether it will perhaps affect all the humanity, with 
unprecedented consequences. “Trivial” and “epochal” are being “cooked” to-
gether in one pot, and their “essential” difference can become clear only af-
terwards, ex eventu.
To be engaged means firstly to be strongly “receptive” to the circumstances, 
and that is because of his, to some extent, being handed over to them, without 
being able to throw them away. This is why they stand as something “given” 
within my situation. Human’s determination by circumstances is never abso-
lute. If the case, it would have made any engagement in advance impossible 
or meaningless. “Engagement”, as being called by to the given that press, pro-
voke, etc., but does not chain me – this is the starting point for the active en-
gagement, which acts back to the circumstances. Engagement is possible only in 
the conditions of non-absolute and non-irrevocable determination. A creature 
that would have been completely free, non-conditioned, deprived of nothing 
important, could not even possibly engage. For example, God, as, by defini-
tion, non-conditioned and non-restrained, cannot be “engaged”, because he 
makes his Will and/or Thought directly real, without the necessity to make any 
effort with uncertain consequences, perfectly in accordance with his creative 
intention. All this is, of course, reversed by (human) engagement. Needless 
to say, but still – a notion of “animal’s engagement” would bare of any sense.
When engaging, one is not only limited in one’s ability to act, but also in 
capability to see reality properly. Therefore, he reckons in advance that his 
STUDIES AND ARTICLES │ 185
vision of reality is constrained and may prove wrong, as well as that his actions 
may be unsuccessful and may produce completely unintended consequences. 
All of these three internally related features belong to the situational finite-
ness of the engaged agent. His relative determination by the given and the 
relative openness for the possibility of practicing one’s own freedom are two 
theoretically and practically inseparable and complementary concepts: “being 
free means being able to live in the direction of my own shaping, means be-
ing able to constantly fight against all obstacles that resist my actual personal 
life” (Landsberg 1998: 121). Finality and engagement are two faces of a struc-
ture that typologically occupies the middle ground between the absolute pre-
determination of life by circumstances, on the one hand, and the possibility 
of a ‘sovereign’, pseudo-divine govern of own life, on the other.
An engaged human is the one who, opposite early modern optimism, has 
realized that he is not an alter Deus, master of the world and the measure of all 
things. On the other hand, he will not and cannot return to those life roles and 
ways of shaping life practices that were largely predetermined by closed cos-
mo-social structures, as in pre-modernity. An engaged man is not only in the 
middle between complete powerlessness and omnipotence but also between 
inactive thinking and reckless, ultimately irresponsible, acting. He is there-
fore neither a “powerless intellectual” standing for an “excess” of reflection 
but a complete lack of action or its effectiveness, nor an “irresponsible thug” 
(Landsberg 1998: 122), representing an “excess” of (self-interested) activity, but 
a total lack of self-reflection and awareness of own responsibility. An engaged 
person is, therefore, one in which inseparable thought and action, as well as 
interest and responsibility.
Human’s exposure to the given is not only a consequence of external con-
ditionality, but the potential for it carries within himself; his situationality 
does not only stem from the external environment. Namely, “to live humanly” 
means to be “inserted into space and time”, to be “tied to the contingency of 
the body” and thus “rooted” in the situation (Ladrière 1969: 650). Moreover, 
thanks to our physicality, we “receive the ability to be situational” (ibid). To 
have a flesh, or rather: being-flesh (which is, according to Helmuth Plessner, 
quite different from animals’ mode of corporeality) – it is the germ of a person’s 
situational engagement, of his being-already-committed. Only by departing 
from his physical situatedness, as being “planted” oneself somewhere within 
the space through own body, can human afterwards become actively engaged, 
by word, mental, physical, symbolic, institutional... act. Passive engagement 
(i.e. flesh-dependent situationality) precedes – both temporally and concep-
tually – not only active engagement but is also its direct precondition. More-
over, the latter is a form of reciprocation, of a “polemic” – between my being 
“caught” in a situation and my endeavour to not only conceptualize it, but also 
to overcome, or at least relativize, the initial state of my being thrown into a 
situation randomly “assigned” to me. In the engagement, if put to the extreme, 
it is always at work an active resistance to my own unchosen, accidental and, 
as it were, senseless being-assigned to a situation which is supposed to be me 
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mine. By doing this, I should try to make sense of the mere fact of being here 
and then, as such and such, surrounded by those and those…
My physicality is an a priori condition for my capability of reception of ex-
ternal physicality – enjoying it, feeling threatened with it, or being indiffer-
ent towards it. Physicality is in and around me. Hence Merleau-Ponty’s ques-
tion: “Where are we to put the limit between the body and the world, since 
the world is flesh? [...] The world seen is not ‘in’ my body, and my body is not 
‘in’ the visible world ultimately: as flesh applied to a flesh, the world neither 
surrounds it nor is surrounded by it.” (Merleau-Ponty 1968: 138) There is a re-
lationship of mutual conditioning between “internal” and “external” physical-
ity: “The flesh of the world is not explained by the flesh of the body, nor the 
flesh of the body by the negativity or self that inhabits it – the 3 phenomena 
are simultaneous.” (ibid: 250)
A given could be of different kinds – given of experiences, effects, my/our 
past life, social situations, historical situations… – but all of them are possi-
ble on the ground of the original form of the givenness – and this is one’s own 
flesh. Human, however, is not only surrounded by the given, not he just incor-
porates, but also produces it. Even something he created is further received 
by him as a given, as something whose meaning and being he cannot possess 
and determine. That is why for Levinas “every work is a failed act” (Levinas 
1998: 29). Due to the initial predominance of being-situated/committed over 
my agency, alienation from the agent’s intentions is immanent to its actions’ 
effects, so that their consequences are not solely my creation, but instead, they 
also bear the mark of something essentially other, a given which is not mine. 
However, the given of which I am the (co)author is, in its genuine sense, a re-
sidual of my intentional acting back to the world as many of already existing 
given. In any case, engaging in one important sense is always counter-engaging 
– a response to the realm of the factual realities already being here.
The actual meaning of intentional engagement is to relativize the pressure 
exerted on me by the realm of givenness – by creating an alternative, my own 
landscape of existence, where I could recognize the environment as friendly, 
like the one I/we created, where, as far as possible, the dispute between the 
self and his situation will be settled. However, what is done tends always to 
alienate itself from its author, to “behave” as a (new) state of affairs which is 
alien to him, rather than being his expression; in short, it serves not as an oc-
casion for his self-recognition but disidentification. That is why the agent’s la-
tent-unconscious ontological desire of all engagement must always generally 
remain: to make his own situation, and consequently his own identity, solely 
his own creation. Nevertheless, this is impossible, so the “fall” in the condi-
tion of finiteness even in the case of the most “successful” life engagement – 
is ultimately irrevocable.
In a concrete act of engagement, therefore, it is never a question of creating 
the ideal situation, but it always presupposes the tacit assent to imperfection. 
It could be said, that engagement even requires “certain decisions for imper-
fect things” (Landsberg 1998: 119). The same author emphasizes that
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it is difficult to decide for an imperfect thing [...] but the value of engagement 
lies in the fruitful tension between the imperfection of the thing [for which one 
is engaged] and its irrevocable character. Due to the awareness of imperfection, 
fidelity to a thing will be protected from bigotry, i.e. from every conviction that 
one lives in the possession of complete and absolute truth. (ibid)
The last statement in the quotation provides the external regulatory princi-
ple of engagement, which, however, does not stem from its very “nature”, which 
explains the fact that unfortunately engaged people are not often guided by it.
Personal engagement is framed by a situation that is not only mine, nor 
the situation of the few I know, with whom I regularly keep up a face-to-face 
relationship, but, in an important sense, the situation of many, to me, largely 
unknown multitude. That is why self-engagement is in principle – though not 
necessarily always in each case – inseparable from collective or social engage-
ment. This moment, in broad strokes, is sketched again by Landsberg:
Thrown into a world full of opposites, each of us often experiences the need 
to withdraw from the game and to posit oneself above the events, as a separate 
observer. The motive behind such an escape from the world is not sheer ego-
ism, but rather a desire for the possibility of establishing a meaningful life in 
one’s personal and isolated sphere, to become in line with oneself. [...] How-
ever, we soon realize that this attitude does not fit our true situation. [...] [o]
ur human existence is so entangled in the collective destiny that our lives can 
never reach their meaning beyond participation in the history of the collectives 
to which we belong. (ibid)
Thus, it turns out, that something that commences as a personal engage-
ment gets its social component as well. However, social engagement is not 
only a complement to personal engagement, but rather there is a circular re-
lationship between the two – in that personal engagement can also be seen as 
contributing to the goals of a particular community or, by extrapolation, of all 
humanity. Social engagement should be perceived just as an extension of exis-
tential engagement also because, for example, a personal existential situation 
is not limited to an “immediate” environment. Engaging for others, that is, for 
us (the “other plus me”), is just as legitimate a modality of engagement as en-
gaging for oneself. Ideally, the one who works on himself, to fit his situation 
to his goals, is also engaged in the domestication of our present life circum-
stances, which adds to his personal engagement a social dimension. Viewed in 
the opposite direction, the “self-embedding” of individual existence into col-
lective existence might redeem meaning and value to the former that it could 
not produce or attain if relying just on oneself. 
The difference between social and existential engagement does not coin-
cide with the difference between public and private engagement – neither in 
extension nor in intensity. Although most of the social engagement is public, 
and much of existential engagement is private, there is also existential public 
engagement – say the preacher, who with his own words publicly testifies the 
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truth he stands for, and the same could go even for a professor in humanities. 
Again, private engagement needs not only to be just about one’s existence – al-
though existential engagement may involve “significant others”. Loving-emo-
tional engagement, raising children and engaging in a friendly relationship is 
private engagement.4 And besides, each of these sub-segments must not nec-
essarily be relevant to the question of who I actually am, or who I want to be, 
i.e. for the existential engagement in the narrow sense. Social engagement, on 
the other hand, does not have to be public, as in case not only of secret soci-
eties but also when it comes to behind-the-scenes arrangements, where nar-
row, publicly unknown circles decide on matters of social importance. Often, 
contrary to Kant’s provisions, precisely that “private use of the mind” can be 
more influential in dealing with public affairs than its public use.
Existential and societal engagement may differ in scope, and public and pri-
vate in form. This, however, does not exhaust the typology of essential forms of 
engagement. There is a possibility of “engagement for values” (Ladrière), which 
by its very nature is aimed at enabling a “normal” praxis. Namely, its sense is 
not to achieve some goals, but rather to enable or re-create the conditions for 
a dignified personal and/or communal life. Thus, such an engagement has a 
corrective-regulatory function, and, obviously, stands in direct analogy with 
what Sartre called a “secondary act.” Such an engagement is relevant in the 
general field of practice since the commitment to universal and unconditional 
self-worth (Justice, Truth, Good) should create the preconditions for expedi-
ent and dignified individual and collective (primary) engagement. However, it 
is also important as an (at least) attempt at (compensatory) production of the 
structure of objective meaning in the modern world, devoid of a transcendent 
order, and can therefore also be regarded as a cosmological engagement.
Due to its “pedagogical” relevance, such engagement is mostly linked to the 
public space. However, it does not have to be exclusively publicly performed. 
Even in the private circle, it is possible to push for the highest values  – friend-
ship, loyalty, love, truthfulness, patriotism ... – without disclosing outside of 
an intimate circle of persons. Furthermore, from the individual attitude to 
one’s own particular, so to say, “axiological” engagement depends on where 
and in which way one’s own private and public engagement will be separat-
ed and where will they not. Besides, this shaping of attitude towards own en-
gagement is also an additional type kind of engagement – engagement towards 
engagement, namely, which points to the engagement’s reflexivity, already in-
dicated concerning secondary acts, or, if rephrased: metaengagement. Finally, 
from this conceptual exposition, we can so far conclude that the various forms 
of engagement do not constitute a conceptual whole whose individual cases 
fall under a single, overarching notion of engagement, but are rather linked by 
the pattern of “family resemblance”.
4  Therefore, it is not sustainable that “the sphere of engagement is always public” 
(Makowiak 2005). Not every manifestation is public, and not every exteriority of the 
acting subject is the public.
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Speaking about engagement’s taxonomy, it can, in short, be divided into 
individual, intersubjective, group and institutional – concerning its degree or 
scope. As for the first type, it does not imply any manifest interaction with 
the others, but it might involve latent affective, emotional or rational inten-
tionality directed towards the others, which remains unknown to them. Inter-
subjective interaction involves the exchange between persons being in close 
contact so that their interaction involves I-thou-relationship. In a collective 
interaction, however, such a personal relationship is rare and is not represen-
tative of its nature and outcomes. Furthermore, it is possible to divide the en-
gagement into passive (being-committed) – be it voluntarily or unchosen – and 
active, i. e. intentional engaging. Individual and intersubjective engagement is 
mostly space where existential engagement is performed, while group-collec-
tive and institutional engagement is a space for practicing social engagement. 
But contrary to what might be expected, intersubjective engagement can also 
be public (for instance in so-called “talk-show”), as well as group engagement 
can remain private, for instance in case closed groups insisting on their sepa-
ration from the rest of society (such as in religious sects). Finally, engagement 
can be sub-divided by its format: engagements related to the dynamics of the 
(un)conscious, behaviour, act and deed.
Engagement in a “Postmodern” Environment
In recent years, even decades, new technologies have led to the expansion and 
internal multiplication of the space of the life-world, so that the virtual be-
comes the ever-important co-scene of life practice, which, in addition, causes 
both – multiplication and atomization of forms of engagement. An individual 
could emerge as an engaged agent in many different roles, which do not neces-
sarily have to converge towards the regulatory criterion of achieving the unity 
of the overall individual’s practice. In each of these roles – as professionally, 
economically, politically, friendly, emotionally, scientifically ... engaged – it 
is possible to undertake a variety of micro-engagements, i.e. separate actions 
or to experience short-lived sequences, also in the virtual sphere. The recent 
experience confirms that this area is not just another field of engagement, 
but a sphere that also mediates and, more or less, changes all known, “tradi-
tional” (i.e. technologically non-virtualized) forms of engagement. This type 
of experience, in addition to the easy and simplified possibility of “acting”, is 
– in comparison with the “real” world – distinguished by the atypical loose-
ness of the linkage between acting, its effects, and consequences. While in the 
non-virtual sphere, the agent almost immediately feels the consequences and 
the factual weight of what he has done, which constantly reminds him of his 
responsibility for it, this feeling is fairly relativized in the virtual realm. How-
ever, the virtuality contains one important moment similar to the pre-virtual 
reality: it is not only a field of heightened, excessive freedom but also an area 
where also  new type realities and their respective relationships could emerge.
THE CONCEPT OF ENgAgEmENT190 │ CHASLAV D. KOPRIVITSA
The growth and hypertrophy of the mechanisms of technological mediation 
of the whole, both non-virtual and virtual reality are followed by an increase 
of different types of relationships and the degree of mutual dependence and 
co-referentiality of the agents while enhancing the number and types of roles 
in which an individual emerges in everyday life. For example, a man from the 
time before the invention of motor vehicles could simply move through settle-
ments, without being obliged to carry institutionally recognized, i.e. imposed 
role of “traffic participant”, be it driver or pedestrian. Being a priori attribut-
ed with this possibility [Können – Adolf Reinach] means to be included in the 
corresponding circuits, ie. he is engaged as a traffic participant, and therefore 
has a duty to take note of it and to act in accordance with the respective, pos-
itive rules. Thus, one realized technological possibility imposed on him an 
obligation that he could not ignore – if he did not want to be held legally, in 
some case even morally responsible, i.e. to endanger himself and other people.
There are many such roles, and they are partly “active” (as an opportunity 
to get new institutional possibilities) and partly “passive” (as a duty, obliga-
tion): voter, taxpayer, bearer of health insurance, public transport user, a user 
of bank services/cards, the “holder” of personal accounts on various websites 
... Today’s man has, thus, become overburdened with all these innumerable 
roles – and above all, with passive commitments, which lulls him with the 
obligation to constantly, often simultaneously, respond to them. If one takes 
into account the degree of individual’s exposure to information and sensory 
impacts in the public and private space is getting emerged, a clear picture of 
the real danger that due to the burden of expanding sensory-cognitive mate-
rial,5 which excites and seduces his, and because of growing multiplication of 
the roles he must play at the same time – his ability to constitute himself as an 
engaging subject and to remain so is markedly diminished.
If at the (modern) beginnings of what we called the condition of commit-
ment engagement was a standard form of the human relationship to the world, 
nowadays it is increasingly becoming something to be fought for. Inflationary 
(passive) commitments – despite the abundance of opportunities offered to-
day – is inversely proportional to (active) engagement and, moreover, seriously 
questions it. It is, therefore, necessary to somehow “clear” (not remove, which 
is impossible) the abundance around us (and in ourselves), to re-organize it so 
that, instead of being merely a passive recipient – which we essentially remain 
even when driven by the abundance of possibilities at hand, have the illusion 
of out active agency – we become a truly active agent, again. If Sartre speaks of 
secondary engagement, which is to enable my true (“primary”) acting through 
5  Тhe idea of enslavement of the mind is well-known, but newly has been insisted 
upon the concept of sensory enslavement. For Berleant, “those capacities of human 
sensibility have been deliberately appropriated and distorted in mass consumer culture 
in at least four distinct ways: by gastronomic co-optation, technological co-optation, 
emotional co-optation, and psychological co-optation. By appropriating, controlling, 
and impairing the capacities of human perception, these forms of co-optation under-
mine the free sensibility.” (Berleant 2017: 4)
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the acts that I wish to pursue a certain state of affairs, then nowadays emerg-
es the necessity of, so to speak, “tertiary engagement,” which will give me the 
opportunity to become aware of the nature of my commitment, and to regain 
my cognitive-practical6 status as a subject capable of engaging. 
The multiplication of possible types of engagement is not the only novelty 
of human’s condition of commitment in the postmodern era. An utter abun-
dance of the possible, as a matter of fact ever more disproportionate to its ex-
istential, and not least biological finiteness, is by some felt like an occasion to 
experiment with own engagement(s). Thus instead of the “traditional” (existen-
tialist) projection of convergence of all particular cases and types of one’s en-
gagement towards the unity of one’s practice, and hence the unity of one’s iden-
tity – the individual of today is often rather inclined to practice intentionally 
divergent engagement(s), whose “purpose” lies not in a kind of self-realization, 
but in experiencing ever new, as numerous as possible opportunities. Thus, 
due to the exponential expansion of the field of possibilities, whose bearers, 
performers, “users” are in many cases increasingly difficult to identify, former 
individual’s ambition of bringing the multitude of things into the unity of life 
practice is resigning, and he tacitly accepts a different, two-sided life-practi-
cal imperative: experience for the sake of experience, or: (logical) possibility as 
equal to (practical) opportunity. Instead of an intention towards the unity of 
the multitude, to attain identity, as a correlate of the final, well-rounded out-
come of existence, this sort of behaviour establishes a pattern of counter(self)
realization, which now occupies the place of self-realization. The human is, 
namely, eager to try out ever new possibilities, which do not have to create a 
narrative, let alone “higher” type of unity with his earlier life.
As part of such alternative, experimental engagement, it is also possible – 
even for the sake of sheer “play” – to apply patterns from one field of engage-
ment into another one, which is one way of exploring and discovering new 
(fields) of opportunities for engagement. In this sense, a typical phenomenon 
of contemporary hyper-individualistic life-practice is the entrepreneurial at-
titude of the individual towards own life (not only of his professional aspect), 
but also, for instance, towards the body – as a means of taking risks, but also 
as a way of alternative counter-realization – within a framework where one’s 
fluid, in infinite distance lying “identity” is greatly reduced to physicality. “The 
body, whose shape changed after intense training, has become the most im-
portant part of the subject – it is a visible social form of personality.” “Being-fit 
becomes a program of the ‘right’ lifestyle.”7 “Fit” actually means well-adapted, 
or, more accurately: willing to actively adapt oneself, fitting to the social im-
peratives of today – and not being always just physically well-prepared. This 
6  An engaged man, of course, is not only reduced to cognition: “An engagement act 
is a ‘total act’, since it is not only an act of isolated intelligence, or of an isolated will, 
but is “an act of an integral man in which the intellect and the will mix.” (Landsberg 
1998: 120)
7  Alkemeyer 2007: 17 (emphasized by Ch. K.). 
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adjustment is made based on “free choice”, as an ideological catalyzer of “active 
living”. Here, however, there is not about actually active living – as it was, in 
a self-congratulating manner, “labeled”, since in such a practical constellation 
the form of the life goal, if there is awareness of such a thing, is already more 
or less predetermined. Such pseudo-engagement, living in the false appearance 
of freedom and activity, follows the pre-accepted and critically unreflected 
guidelines of life practice, strictly conformed to a technologically mediated 
social system, which, in effect, turns out to be a totalitarian. Thus, ostensibly, 
the creative-exploratory extension of the field of the exercise of own personal 
freedom (for), has as her reverse side, a tacit consent to the individual-collec-
tive imitation of the existing social order and the demands of leading, increas-
ingly anonymous forces within it.
Instead of engagement’s, as previously, being shaped as acting back to the 
primary being-committed, it turns into seemingly active, but, in the core, ideo-
logically repressive repetition of existing structures of illegitimate power. Thus, 
if seen from the angle of individual, who tacitly “agreed” with its con-formation 
to the environment, the permanent crisis, caused by the of the secular largely 
unfinished and therefore questionable cosmosocial image, is being ideologi-
cally normalized. The absent cosmosocial truth in advanced postmodernity is 
compensated by its successfully effective appearance. Thanks to this maneu-
ver, one who tacitly agrees to such an arrangement – offered to him through 
epistemically-practically-normatively charged social structures – ceases to be 
as a forcedly engaged “hostage” of (absent) truth. Human’s “engagement” is no 
longer a consequence of truth’s absence, but it is rather a permanent confirma-
tion of ideologically stabilized pseudo-truth of the current System.
The essence of the System is anonymous, uncontrolled power, which be-
comes a key feature of the “solution” of the problem of truth in our epoch (of 
so-called “post-truth”) only in advanced postmodernity, when emerge – ei-
ther spontaneously generated, or purposefully invented – socio-psycholog-
ical mechanisms of finding, embedding and stabilizing ideological substitu-
tions of truth. Then, since the (public) problem of truth is supposedly closed, 
there is no need for genuine engagement, where almost everything essential 
for the human is at stake. Even more, the guardians of post-truth watch care-
fully after her, to prevent the raising of reasonable demands for re-opening 
social discussion on truth. The only risk that the contemporary, hyper-activ-
ist, highly fitted individual is exposed – is the social failure, in the game of 
competition for the (re)distribution of individually or group-specific power, 
but not the failure of one’s own practical projection of truth, as the basis for 
the fulfillment of own life practice. The hyper-conformed individual already 
“knows” the whole, “Truth”, because he is anesthetized with a socio-psycho-
logical structure, within which any explicit asking the question about the truth 
is rendered as superfluous, strange, even dangerous, in advance. Therefore, the 
age of the so-called “Post-truth” also becomes the age of “post-engagement”.
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U ovom radu osvjetljavamo osnovne crte koncepta angažovanja, koji je postao moguć tek u 
sekularnom svijetu, s pojavom moderne indvidue lišene bilo kakvog stabilnog, vječnog po-
retka i hijerarhije vrijednosti. Ipak, angažovanje je pritom nije samo individualno nego i ko-
lektivno, budući da izostanak izvjesnosti o istini ne pogađa samo zajednicu i društvo nego i 
njih motiviše da slijede istu paradigmu kao pojedinac – da sebe stave na kocku, ne znajući 
kuda će to voditi, ali s namjerom da na koncu proizvede opipljive i stabilne socio-kosmičke 
strukture, koja bi mogla ublažiti neizvjesnost, a time i nesigurnost. Nužnost angažovanja po-
tiče od okolnosti da čovjek živi u kontekstu zasićenom značenjima koja ga već unaprijed pro-
zivaju i utiču na njega. Stoga angažovanje znači uzvratno djelovanje izloženosti značenjima 
i strukturama koja su već uticala na čovjeka i njegovu situaciju. Jedan odjeljak teksta posve-
ćen je razumijevanja angažovanja u savremenoj, „postmodernoj“ epohi.
Ključne reči: angažovanje, egzistencijalna situacija, neizvjesnost, filosofija konačnosti, seku-
larnost, postmoderna
